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Regulatory approval of new drugs is
assumed to reflect a judgment that a
medication’s benefits outweigh its harms.
Despite this, controversy over approved
drugs is common. If sales can be consid-
ered a proxy for utility, the controversies
surrounding even the most successful
drugs (such as blockbuster drugs) seem all
the more paradoxical, and have revealed
the extent to which the success of many
drugs has been driven by sophisticated
marketing rather than verifiable evidence
[1,2]. But even among institutions that
aim to provide the least biased, objective
assessments of a drug’s effects, determining
‘‘the truth’’ can be extremely difficult.
Consider the case of the influenza
antiviral Tamiflu (oseltamivir). Prior to
the global outbreak of H1N1 influenza in
2009, the United States alone had stock-
piled nearly US$1.5 billion dollars worth
of the antiviral [3]. As the only drug in its
class (neuraminidase inhibitors) available
in oral form, Tamiflu was heralded as the
key pharmacologic intervention for use
during the early days of an influenza
pandemic when a vaccine was yet to be
produced. It would cut hospitalizations
and save lives, said the US Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS) [4].
The Advisory Committee on Immuniza-
tion Practices (ACIP, the group the US
Centers for Disease Control and Preven-
tion [CDC] uses to form national influen-
za control policy) said it would reduce the
chances of developing complications from
influenza [5]. So, too, did the Australian
Therapeutic Goods Administration [6]
and the European Medicines Agency
(EMA) [7].
Most (perhaps all) of these claims can be
traced back to a single source: a meta-
analysis published in 2003 that combined
ten randomized clinical trials conducted
during the late 1990s by the manufacturer
prior to US registration of the drug [8].
This analysis, conducted by Kaiser and
colleagues, proposed that oseltamivir treat-
ment of influenza reduced both secondary
complications and hospital admission. In
contrast, the Food and Drug Administra-
tion (FDA), which approved Tamiflu in
1999 and was aware of these same clinical
trials, concluded that Tamiflu had not been
shown to reduce complications, and re-
quired an explicit statement in the drug’s
label to that effect [9]. FDA even cited
Roche, Tamiflu’s manufacturer, for viola-
tion of the law for claims made to the
contrary [10].
Nor did the FDA approve an indication
for Tamiflu in the prevention of transmis-
sion of influenza [9,11]. This assumption
was at the heart of the World Health
Organization’s (WHO) proposed plan to
suppress an emergent pandemic through
mass prophylaxis [12]. While the WHO
recently added Tamiflu to its Essential
Medicines list, if FDA is right, the drug’s
effectiveness may be no better than aspirin
or acetaminophen (paracetemol). The
FDA has never clarified the many discrep-
ancies in claims made over the effects of
Tamiflu. Although it may have limited
approval indications accordingly, the FDA
has never challenged the US HHS or the
US CDC for making far more ambitious
claims. This means that critical analysis by
an independent group such as a Cochrane
review group is essential.
But which data should be used? In
updating our Cochrane review of neur-
aminidase inhibitors, we have become
convinced that the answer lies in analyzing
clinical study reports rather than the
traditional published trials appearing in
biomedical journals [13]. Clinical study
reports contain the same information as
journal papers (usually in standardized
sections, including an introduction, meth-
ods, results, and conclusion [14]), but have
far more detail: the study protocol,
analysis plan, numerous tables, listings,
and figures, among others. They are far
larger (hundreds or thousands of pages),
and represent the most complete synthesis
of the planning, execution, and results of a
clinical trial. Journal publications of clin-
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ical trials may generate media attention
[2], propel researchers’ careers, and gen-
erate some journals a revenue stream [15].
However, when regulators decide whether
to register a new drug in a manufacturer’s
application, they review the trial’s clinical
study report.
In 2010, we began our Cochrane review
update using clinical study reports rather
than published papers [16]. We obtained
some sections of these clinical study reports
for the ten trials appearing in the Kaiser
2003 meta-analysis from Tamiflu’s manu-
facturer, Roche—around 3,200 pages in
total. In 2011, we obtained additional
sections of clinical study reports for Tamiflu
through a Freedom of Information request
to the EMA, amounting to tens of thou-
sands of pages. While extensive and
detailed, it is important to note that what
we have obtained is just a subset of the full
clinical study reports in Roche’s possession.
Nonetheless, Box 1 provides a list of details
we have already discovered—and would
have never discovered without access to
these documents. This information has
turned our understanding of the drug’s
effects on its head. Other drugs for which
previously unpublished, detailed clinical
trial data have radically changed public
knowledge of safety and efficacy include
Avandia, Neurontin, and Vioxx (Table 1).
An Urgent Call for a Debate on
the Ethics of Data Secrecy
Taken together, these experiences sug-
gest that any attempt at reliable evidence
synthesis must begin with clinical study
reports. Yet we are aware of only three
other groups of independent researchers
conducting a systematic review based
entirely (or mostly) on these and other
regulatory documents [17–19]. We can
think of two major reasons this might be.
First, outside of regulatory agencies, few
researchers have ever heard of clinical
study reports. Second, clinical study re-
ports are massive in size and difficult to
obtain, traditionally shared only with
regulators. The first problem seems trac-
table, but gaining better access to manu-
facturers’ clinical study reports requires
shifting the status quo from a default
position of confidentiality to one of
disclosure.
In the mid-20th century, regulatory
agencies became increasingly responsible
to the public for ensuring the safety and
effectiveness of approved medicines. This
rise paralleled an increase in the number
and complexity of clinical trials. Both in
the United States and Europe, manufac-
turers would come to submit trial data to
regulators with the assurance that author-
ities would treat all trade secret data as
confidential. Even following passage of the
1966 Freedom of Information Act (FOIA),
the FDA maintained that safety and
effectiveness test data were not subject to
the FOIA [20,21]. One sign things may be
changing came in November 2010, when
the EMA announced its intention to make
all industry clinical study reports about a
drug publicly available as a matter of
standard practice after reaching a regula-
tory decision [22,23]. The EMA has also
already improved its handling of data
under Freedom of Information requests.
But as we learned was true for Tamiflu,
regulators may not be in possession of full
trial reports of all studies on a given
intervention, implying the necessity of
obtaining reports from manufacturers
[11]. But at present, industry seems
extremely reluctant to make its clinical
study reports freely available.
In addition to clinical study reports, we
also need access to regulatory informa-
tion. By the very nature of their profes-
sional mandate, regulators may conduct
some of the most thorough evaluations of
a trial program, and efforts like ours
aimed at up-to-date evidence synthesis
are seriously deprived without access to
their reports. While the FDA has increas-
ingly published its reviews, memos, and
Summary Points
N Systematic reviews of published randomized clinical trials (RCTs) are considered
the gold standard source of synthesized evidence for interventions, but their
conclusions are vulnerable to distortion when trial sponsors have strong
interests that might benefit from suppressing or promoting selected data.
N More reliable evidence synthesis would result from systematic reviewing of
clinical study reports—standardized documents representing the most
complete record of the planning, execution, and results of clinical trials, which
are submitted by industry to government drug regulators.
N Unfortunately, industry and regulators have historically treated clinical study
reports as confidential documents, impeding additional scrutiny by indepen-
dent researchers.
N We propose clinical study reports become available to such scrutiny, and
describe one manufacturer’s unconvincing reasons for refusing to provide us
access to full clinical study reports. We challenge industry to either provide
open access to clinical study reports or publically defend their current position
of RCT data secrecy.
Box 1. What Is Missed without Access to Tamiflu Clinical Study
Reports
1. Knowledge of the total denominator. (How many trials were conducted on this
drug that might fit the systematic review inclusion criteria?) [13]
2. Realization that serious adverse events (SAEs) occurred in trials for which SAEs
were not reported in published papers [13].
3. Understanding what happened in some trials that were published 10 years after
completion [43].
4. Vital details of trials (content and toxicity profile of placebos, mode of action of
drug, description and temporality of adverse events) [11].
5. Authorship is not consistent with published papers [44] (although, if a review’s
inclusion criteria include clinical study reports, authorship is not an issue, as the
responsibility is clearly the manufacturer’s).
6. Rationale for alternatively classifying outcomes such as pneumonia as a
complication or an adverse event [16].
7. Ability to know whether key subgroup analysis (influenza-infected subjects) is
valid [11].
8. Assessment of validity of previously released information on the drug (articles,
reviews, conferences, media, etc.).
9. Realization that Roche’s claim of Tamiflu’s mode of action [45] appears
inconsistent with the evidence from trials [11,46].
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other correspondence on its Drugs@FDA
website (http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/
scripts/cder/drugsatfda/), and additional
documents are accessible through FOIA
requests, the process can be very time-
consuming, taking months or even years.
Moreover, regulatory agencies’ lack of
public inventories of their documentary
holdings complicates the retrieval of
information. Ideally, we would also have
details of the regulators’ deliberations,
which can serve as signposts to important
issues that need investigating.
In December 2009, after we voiced
serious concerns in the BMJ about Tami-
flu’s alleged ability to reduce complica-
tions [24], Roche wrote that it was ‘‘very
happy to have its data reviewed by
appropriate authorities or individuals,’’
and publicly pledged to release ‘‘full study
reports’’ for ten trials ‘‘within the coming
days’’ [25]. But despite extensive corre-
spondence over the next year and a half,
Roche refused to provide any more than
portions of the clinical study reports for
the ten Kaiser studies (Table 2) and no
reports for any of the additional Tamiflu
Table 1. Different sources of data for the uncovering of failures in reporting of safety and effectiveness of some examples of new
drugs.
Drug (Trade Name; Manufacturer) Brief History
Type and Magnitude of the
Problem How the Problem Was Discovered
Rosiglitazone (Avandia; GSK) FDA approval granted in 1999 for
use in diabetes. EMA did not approve,
initially, over concerns about lack of
evidence of efficacy, but granted
approval in 2000. In 2001, FDA issued
new warnings over concerns about
cardiovascular risks (especially acute
myocardial infarction). In a separate
lawsuit in 2004, GSK agreed to publicly
post online details of all its clinical
trials. In 2010, the EMA suspended
rosiglitazone. The company is dealing
with 10,000 to 20,000 cases of
litigation in the United States alone.
The primary trials had weaknesses
of the methods, including excessive
loss to follow-up, and over-emphasis
on proxy outcome measures (blood
glucose levels rather than mortality
and morbidity outcomes) [27–29].
2005–2007 series of meta-analyses
increasingly suggest harms, especially
cardiovascular.
Public disclosure of unpublished study
results was critical to uncovering the
evidence of harm [30].
Gabapentin (Neurontin; Parke-Davis,
a Pfizer subsidiary)
FDA approval was granted in 1994
for a narrow indication: adjunctive
treatment for epilepsy (partial
seizures). The company was accused
of using aggressive marketing using
systematic methods, including key
opinion leaders (KOLs), to promote
off-label use [31–33]. Most sales were
for off-label use. In 2002, FDA
approval was extended to post-
herpetic neuralgia. However, in May
2004, Pfizer agreed to pay a US$240
million criminal fine in the United
States for illegally promoting off-
label use [34].
Delay in publishing company
sponsored trials, such as a 1998
Pfizer-funded study showing lack
of efficacy for bipolar disease, in
which publication was delayed for
two years [34].
An internal whistleblower drew attention
to the problem, which resulted in legal
action taken by US authorities [34,35].
Rofecoxib (Vioxx; Merck) FDA approval granted in 1999. In
2000, the VIGOR study was published,
apparently demonstrating superiority
over non selective inhibition [36]. Data
claimed to have been excluded in a
critical editorial [37]. In 2004, Merck
withdrew the drug. Subsequently,
Merck has been defending against
thousands of liability legal actions
[38] after educational events had
been attempted to declare rofecoxib
was safe [39].
Unexpected and unanticipated
cardiovascular events (principally,
myocardial infarction).
A trial of rofecoxib conducted to
check protection against colon
polyps established an increased
cardiovascular disease (CVD) risk [39].
Concern from a regulator (FDA) that there
might be increased CVD events caused by
the drug. Trial proposed, but not
conducted [39].
Clinical study reports indirectly important
in uncovering the scandal.
Oseltamivir (Tamiflu; Roche) FDA approval granted in 1999. Sales
surged following concern over
avian and pandemic influenza in
2005 and 2009, leading to massive
government stockpiles worldwide.
Numerous governmental bodies
assumed the drug would reduce
the complications of influenza, and
hospitalizations, based on a Roche-
supported meta-analysis of some
efficacy trials [8]. This claim was
challenged by our 2009 Cochrane
review update in response to
criticism [40].
There was a public call for individual
patient data, already provided
confidentially to regulators, to be
made available for public scrutiny [41].
Roche agreed to release ‘‘full study
reports’’, but (as discussed in this
article) later offered multiple reasons
for not providing these data.
The latest Cochrane update relied on
clinical study reports obtained from
regulators (freedom of information
requests), reviews, and other documents
released by regulators and leaked
sources. The manufacturer provided
incomplete reports for some trials. Our
review has led to the detection of
numerous reporting biases and
fundamental problems in trial design, and
we have concluded that previous
effectiveness claims were not supported
by the available evidence.
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1001201.t001
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Table 2. Roche’s reasons for not sharing its clinical study reports and the authors’ response (for 10 trials in Kaiser meta-analysis
[8]).
Roche’s Basis for Reluctance or Refusal to Share Data Response
‘‘Unfortunately we are unable to send you the data requested as a similar
meta analysis is currently commencing with which there are concerns your
request may conflict. We have been approached by an independent expert
influenza group and as part of their meta analysis we have provided access
to Roche’s study reports.’’ (Oct. 8, 2009)
It is unclear why another group of independent researchers would prevent Roche
from sharing the same data with our group.
Cochrane reviewers were ‘‘unwilling to enter into the [confidentiality]
agreement with Roche.’’ (Dec. 8, 2009)
The terms of Roche’s proposed contract were unacceptable to us. We declined to
sign for two reasons: 1) all data disclosed under the contract were to be regarded as
confidential; and 2) signing the contract would also require us ‘‘not to disclose … the
existence and terms of this Agreement’’. We judged that the requirement to keep all
data, and the confidentiality agreement itself, secret would interfere with our explicit
aim of openly and transparently systematically reviewing the trial data and
accounting for their provenance.
Roche says that it was ‘‘under the impression that you [Cochrane] were also
satisfied with its provision based on our correspondence earlier this year
(March 2010).’’ (June 1, 2010)
We did not immediately realize that what Roche had provided was incomplete.
Irrespective of whether we had at one point seemed ‘‘satisfied,’’ Roche had not
delivered what it publicly promised in the BMJ on Dec. 8, 2009: ‘‘full study reports will
also be made available on a password-protected site within the coming days to
physicians and scientists undertaking legitimate analyses.’’
‘‘… around 3,200 pages of information have already been provided by
Roche for review by your group and the scientific community.’’ (Aug. 20, 2010)
What is important is completeness, and 3,200 pages is a fraction of the full study
reports for the ten Kaiser trials Roche promised to make available.
‘‘Roche undertook this action [release of 3,200 pages] to demonstrate our
complete confidence in the data and our commitment to transparency to the
degree to which patient confidentiality, data exclusivity and the protection of
intellectual property allow.’’ (Aug. 20, 2010)
This implies that release of the promised-but-never-released data would impinge on
‘‘patient confidentiality, data exclusivity and the protection of intellectual property’’.
This does not seem to apply to many elements of clinical study reports (e.g., the trial
protocol and reporting analysis plan), and it is unclear why personal data could not
be anonymized.
‘‘The amount of data already made accessible to the scientific community
through our actions extends beyond what is generally provided to any third
party in the absence of a confidentiality agreement.’’ (Aug. 20, 2010)
It is irrelevant what is ‘‘generally provided’’. What is relevant is what was promised
and the need for public disclosure of clinical study reports.
‘‘Over the last few months, we have witnessed a number of developments
which raise concerns that certain members of Cochrane Group involved
with the review of the neuraminidase inhibitors are unlikely to approach the
review with the independence that is both necessary and justified. Amongst
others, this includes incorrect statements concerning Roche/Tamiflu made
during a recent official enquiry into the response to last year’s pandemic
by a member of this Cochrane Review Group. Roche intends to follow up
separately to clarify this issue. We also note with concern that certain
investigators, who the Cochrane Group is proposing will carry out the
planned review, have previously published articles covering Tamiflu
which we believe lack the appropriate scientific rigor and objectivity.’’
(Aug. 20, 2010)
Despite Roche’s promise and our request for specifics, Roche never responded
directly.
‘‘We noted in our correspondence to the BMJ in December of last year our
concern that the first requests for data to assist in your review did not come
from the Cochrane Group, but from the media apparently trying to obtain
data following discussions with the Cochrane Review Group. This raised
serious questions regarding the motivation for the review from the outset.
We note that in subsequent correspondence regarding your next planned
review you have copied a number of journalists when responding to emails
sent by Roche staff.’’ (Aug. 20, 2010)
Our view is that Tamiflu is a global public health drug and the media have a
legitimate reason for helping independent reviewers obtain data, which includes
being informed of our efforts to do so.
Cochrane reviewers have been provided with ‘‘all the trial data [they]
require …’’ (Jan. 14, 2011)
We disagree. First, it is up to us to decide what we require. Second, we now know
that what was provided was not enough. For example, Roche did not provide us with
the trial protocols and full amendment history.
‘‘You have all the detail you need to undertake a review and so we have
decided not to supply any more detailed information. We do not believe
the requested detail to be necessary for the purposes of a review of
neuraminidase inhibitors.’’ (April 26, 2011)
We have still not received what was promised in December 2009, and we know that
what we have received is deficient.
‘‘It is the role of Global Regulatory Authorities to review detailed
information of medicines when assessing benefit/risk. This has occurred,
and continues to occur with Tamiflu, as with all other medicines, through
regular license updates.’’ (April 26, 2011)
Independent researchers such as the Cochrane Collaboration share the goal of
assessing benefit/risk, and require all details necessary to competently perform this
function.
‘‘Roche has made full clinical study data available to health authorities
around the world for their review as part of the licensing process.’’ [42]
(Jan. 20, 2012)
Roche may have made full clinical study data ‘‘available’’ but that does not mean they
‘‘provided’’ all regulators with full clinical study data. For at least 15 Tamiflu trials,
Roche did not provide the European regulator (EMA) with full study reports,
apparently because EMA did not expressly request the complete clinical study
reports. (Correspondence with EMA, May 24 and Jul. 20, 2011)
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1001201.t002
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trials we had subsequently identified and
requested (Table 3). Reasons for refusing
to share the full reports on Tamiflu kept
changing, and none seemed credible
(Tables 2 and 3).
There are strong ethical arguments for
ensuring that all clinical study reports are
publicly accessible. It is the public who take
and pay for approved drugs, and therefore
the public should have access to complete
information about those drugs. We should
also not lose sight of the fact that clinical
trials are experiments conducted on hu-
mans that carry an assumption of contrib-
uting to medical knowledge. Non-disclosure
of complete trial results undermines the
philanthropy of human participants and sets
back the pursuit of knowledge.
Potentially valid reasons for restricting
the full public release of clinical study
reports include: ensuring patient confiden-
tiality (although this could be remedied
with redaction); commercial secrets (al-
though these should be clear after drugs
have been registered, and we found no
commercially sensitive information in the
clinical study reports received from EMA
with minimal redactions); and finally,
industry concerns over adversaries’ mali-
cious ‘‘cherry picking’’ over large datasets
(which could be reduced by requiring the
prospective registration of research proto-
cols). None appear insurmountable.
With the EMA’s stated intentions on far
wider data disclosure, we hope the debate
may soon shift from one of whether to
release regulatory data to the specifics of
doing so. But until these policies go into
effect—and perhaps even after they do—
most drugs on the market will remain
those approved in an era in which
regulators protected industry’s data [26].
It is therefore vital to know where industry
stands. If drug companies have legitimate
reasons for maintaining the status quo of
treating all of their data as trade secret, we
have yet to hear them. We are all ears.
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Table 3. Roche’s reasons for not sharing its clinical study reports and the authors’ response (for other Tamiflu trials).
Roche’s Basis for Not Sharing Data Response
‘‘With regards your recent request for additional data, we are taking
the request very seriously and as such must assess this within the wider
organization particularly with respect to our obligations around patient
and physician confidentiality, legality and feasibility’’ (July 24, 2010)
We agree that ‘‘patient and physician confidentiality, legality and feasibility’’ are valid
concerns. However, Roche has never provided details.
With respect to clinical study reports for additional studies beyond the
original ten meta-analyzed by Kaiser: ‘‘we request that you submit your full
analysis plan for review by Roche and the scientific/medical community.’’
(Aug. 20, 2010)
This is a reasonable request. However, we shared our systematic review protocol [16]
with Roche on Dec. 11, 2010, following peer-review and publication online-first on
the cochrane.org website (the usual Cochrane systematic review practice).
‘‘Concerning access to the reports beyond the Kaiser analysis … many are
pharmacokinetic studies conducted in healthy volunteers and so are unlikely
to be useful in a meta analysis. The studies in prevention and in children are
published in peer reviewed publications, or in summary form on www.
rochetrials.com.’’ (Jan. 14, 2011)
What Roche has directed us to is insufficient (peer-reviewed publications and the
extremely compressed summaries of trials on http://www.rochetrials.com) as the
topic of our review is unpublished data, most prominently clinical study reports.
‘‘The long list of studies you sent are either published in peer reviewed
publications, in summary form on www.rochetrials.com, halted early,
or ongoing.’’ (Feb. 14, 2011)
Roche continues to imply the evidentiary equivalence between unpublished clinical
study reports and extremely compressed summary formats such as journal
publications—a position we reject. We have repeatedly stated and shown evidence
(in our study protocol and elsewhere [13,16]) that reliable evidence synthesis requires
access to clinical study reports.
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1001201.t003
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